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Lisa Collins
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State St., 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re: Salt Lake City v. Jaramillo, Case No. 20041125-CA
Letter of Supplemental Authority
Dear Ms. Collins:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Appellant submits
the following supplemental authorities addressing points raised by the parties in their
briefs.
Double Jeopardy. In his brief, Mr. Jaramillo argued that his double jeopardy rights
were violated when the trial court ordered his jail terms to be served consecutively
because it constituted a more severe punishment than originally ordered. See Appellant's
Opening Brief 11. This Court's opinion in State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, TJ23, 17
P.3d 1145, and the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179
(Utah 1981), directly impact on Mr. Jaramillo's argument. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4 at
^f23 (concluding double jeopardy attaches when trial court signs final order precluding
"further medication of the sentence"); Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 181 (defining a "more
severe" sentence as one that "exceed[s] the first in appearance or effect, in the number of
its elements, or in their magnitude").

Sincerely,

Debra M. Nelson
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, DEBRA M. NELSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State,
5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and one copy to Padma
Veeru-Collings, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor, and Aaron M. Aplin, Associate City
Prosecutor, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake

q
City, Utah 84111, this _ I day of June, 2006.

-z
DEBRA M. NELSON

DELIVERED this /

day of June, 2006.
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Supreme Court of Utah.
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Lawrence J. SORENSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 17735.
Dec. 21, 1981.
Defendant was convicted in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., of
four counts of theft, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, 617 P.2d 333, reversed and remanded. On
remand, the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Jay E. Banks, J., entered judgment of conviction,
and imposed sentence. Defendant appealed on
grounds that the second sentence was illegal. The
Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that: (1) under the
statutory prohibition against a "more severe" second
sentence, the second sentence cannot exceed the
first sentence in appearance or effect, in the number
of its elements or in the magnitude, and (2) because
the increase in time of commitment made the
second sentence more severe than the first, the
sentence was invalid, and remand for resentencing
was required.
Remanded for resentencing.
West Headnotes
[1] Double Jeopardy €^>H5
135Hkl 15 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Ok 189)
Statutory prohibition against "more severe" second
sentence means that second sentence cannot exceed
first in appearance or effect, in number of its
elements or in their magnitude; thus, no new
element of sentence can be added and no element
can be augmented in magnitude. U.C.A.1953,
76-3-405;
Const.Art.
8,
§
9;
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.

[2] Double Jeopardy €=^>112.1
135Hkl 12.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 135Hkll2, 110kl89)
Statutory prohibition against "more severe second
sentence precludes
justifying increase in one element of sentence by
reference to decrease in another element, since
possibility of such trade-off could act as deterrent to
appeal by individual defendant. U.C.A.1953,
76-3-405;
Const.Art.
8,
§
9;
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[3] Double Jeopardy €=>H5
135Hkl 15 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Okl 93)
After defendant's original conviction for theft,
which carried sentence of one to 15 years in
penitentiary, with stay of execution and placing of
defendant on two years' probation on condition that
he serve six months in jail and pay full restitution,
was reversed and defendant was convicted for
second time on remand, second sentence of one to
15 years with no restitution, but with service of
sentence to begin without delay, was more severe
than first, and violated statute prohibiting more
severe second sentence and impaired constitutional
right to appeal. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-405; Const.Art.
8, § 9; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[4] Criminal Law €=^1192
HOkl 192 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Okl 188)
After defendant was convicted on remand when his
original conviction was reversed, but second
sentence was more severe than first sentence, on
remand for resentencing, in imposing his third
sentence, court was not required to be constrained
by terms of invalid second sentence, but was only to
assure that sentence it imposed was no more severe
than first sentence. U.C.A.1953, 76- 3-405;
Const.Art. 8, § 9; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
*180 Nancy Bergeson, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
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David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig L. Barlow,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
OAKS, Justice:
After his first conviction for theft was reversed for
trial errors, State v. Sorensen, Utah, 617 P.2d 333
(1980), defendant was re-tried and a jury again
convicted him of theft. Defendant concedes that the
second trial was free from error. His sole argument
on this appeal is that the second sentence was illegal.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct.
2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the Supreme Court
held that due process of law requires that a
defendant be freed from the apprehension that if he
appeals his conviction successfully and is then
convicted at a second trial the trial judge can
retaliate by giving him an increased sentence.
Consequently, the Court held, the sentence imposed
after re-trial cannot be more severe than the original
sentence, unless the reason for the increased
sentence, based on identifiable conduct by the
defendant following the original trial, appears in the
record.

he serve six months in the Salt Lake County jail and
pay full restitution (approximately $45,000). After
his second conviction, defendant was sentenced on
May 5, 1981, to 1 to 15 years. No restitution was
required, but service of sentence was ordered to
begin without delay. By December 18, 1981, when
this case *181 was submitted for decision by this
Court, defendant had been confined for more than
the six months he would have served under the first
sentence.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to be
resentenced to not more than six months, which
would result in his immediate release. The state
argues that the second sentence is not "more severe"
so long as it gives credit in its maximum term for
time already served under the first sentence (none,
in this case) and so long as the combination of
elements in the second sentence does not outweigh
the combination in the original sentence. We find
the state's arguments unpersuasive.

In 1973, our Legislature implemented that
requirement in a more stringent fashion that allows
for no exceptions. So far as pertinent to this appeal,
U.C.A., 1953, s 76-3-405 provides that where a
conviction has been set aside on direct review, "the
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same
conduct which is more severe than the prior
sentence ...." In Chess v. Smith, Utah, 617 P.2d
341, 343 (1980), we held that section 76-3-405 also
prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal
(Article VIII, s 9) from being impaired "by
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the
error of his conviction the risk that he may be
penalized with a harsher sentence for having done
so."

(1)(2) In the context of the due process requirement
of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, which seeks to
assure that there is no chilling or deterring of the
criminal defendant's exercise of his basic
constitutional right to appeal, and in light of the
Utah constitutional constraint against impairing the
right to appeal, as articulated in Chess v. Smith,
supra, we think the meaning of our statutory
prohibition against a "more severe" second sentence
is clear. The second sentence cannot exceed the
first in appearance or effect, in the number of its
elements, U.C.A., 1953, s 76-3-201, or in their
magnitude. This means that no new element of
sentence can be added and that no element can be
augmented in magnitude. It also precludes
justifying an increase in one element of a sentence
by reference to a decrease in another element (in
this case, elimination of restitution while increasing
actual time to be served). This is because the
possibility of such a tradeoff could act as a deterrent
to appeal by an individual defendant.

Following his first conviction, defendant was
sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the penitentiary, but
execution of that sentence was stayed and he was
placed on two years' probation on the condition that

(3)(4) Because the increase in time of commitment
made the second sentence in this case more severe
than the first, the sentence was contrary to section
76-3-405, and also invalid as impairing the
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constitutional right to appeal as explained in Chess
v. Smith, supra. Because the record contains no
reason for the increased sentence, it is also contrary
to the due process requirement articulated in North
Carolina v. Pearce, supra. The sentence is therefore
vacated and the case is remanded for re-sentencing
in conformity with section 76-3-405, as construed in
this opinion. Although that statute requires the
court to deduct "the portions of the prior sentence
previously satisfied," which would include time
served under the second sentence, in imposing its
third sentence the court need not be constrained by
the terms of the invalid second sentence. The
sentencing court need only assure that the sentence
it now imposes is no more severe than the first
sentence.
In view of the special circumstances of this case,
the remittitur of this Court will issue instanter,
notwithstanding the normal rule of Utah R.Civ.P.
76(d).
So ordered.
HALL, C. J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., and
CHRISTINE DURHAM, District Judge, concur.
639P.2dl79
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://print.westlaw.conVdelivery.html?format=HTMLE&dataid-A005580000010

6/9/2006

Page 2 of 9

W?st!aw
17P.3d 1145

Page 1

17 P.3d 1145, 412 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT App 4
(Cite as: 17 P.3d 1145, 2001 UT App 4)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Blaine HORROCKS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 990411-CA.
Jan. 5,2001.
Defendant moved to dismiss felony charges on
ground that they were barred by double jeopardy
because of his pleas in the Justice Court to various
misdemeanor offenses arising out of same incident.
The Fourth District Court, Provo Department,
Anthony W. Schofield, J., denied motion, and
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to use or
possession of psilocybin and use or possession of
marijuana. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Greenwood, P.J., held that: (1) jeopardy
attached when justice court accepted defendant's
pleas to misdemeanor offenses; (2) manifest
necessity existed to allow misplea and dismissal of
misdemeanor charges, such that prosecution could
proceed on new information without violating
double jeopardy.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €=>1134(8)
1 lOkl 134(8) Most Cited Cases
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.
[2] Criminal Law €^>260.13
110k260.13 Most Cited Cases
Defendant exhausted his right to appeal from justice
court's dismissal of misdemeanor offenses in favor
of subsequent felony information when he appealed
to district court under statute providing for trial de
novo, and he had no right thereafter to appeal

district court's decision
U.C.A.1953, 78-5-120.

affirming the dismissal.

[3] Judgment € ^ 6 4 2
228k642 Most Cited Cases
Issue of whether double jeopardy barred State's
reprosecution of defendant on felony charges was
not barred on basis of res judicata or other legal
principles by earlier appeal of justice court's
dismissal of misdemeanor offenses arising out of
same incident, where issue in that case was whether
signed final order was ever issued on defendant's
pleas and thus whether those charges could be
dismissed.
[4] Double Jeopardy € ^ 5 7
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases
Jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty
plea; entry of the plea, rather than the actual
imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment
for determining jeopardy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5
[5] Criminal Law €^274(3.1)
110k274(3.1) Most Cited Cases
[5] Double Jeopardy €=>57
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases
Jeopardy attaches once a plea is accepted by the
court, but the plea can be set aside upon a showing
of manifest necessity before sentencing and
judgment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[6] Sentencing and Punishment €^>2279
350Hk2279 Most Cited Cases
Where, in orally sentencing defendant, the court has
expressly declined to impose a final sentence until it
has had the opportunity to review sentencing
information, court may change sentencing prior to
entering final signed sentencing order.
[7] Double Jeopardy €=^>57
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases
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(Cite as: 17 P.3d 1145, 2001 UT App 4)
[7] Sentencing and Punishment €^>2279
350Hk2279 Most Cited Cases
Although jeopardy attaches when a plea is accepted
by a trial court, the court may (1) change an oral
sentencing decision when it has specifically
reserved that option pending receipt of further
information relevant to sentencing and the
sentencing decision is not binding on the court until
a final written order is entered; or (2) declare a
misplea in limited circumstances where there is
"manifest necessity" to do so and double jeopardy
will not then preclude reprosecution. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
[8] Double Jeopardy €^>57
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases
Jeopardy attached when justice court accepted
defendant's pleas to misdemeanor offenses, even
though final sentencing order was never entered,
such that justice court might thereafter vacate its
acceptance of pleas and dismiss those charges
without violating double jeopardy only upon
showing of manifest necessity and lack of undue
prejudice to defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

retrial.
[11] Double Jeopardy € ^ 5 7
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases
Defendant suffered no undue prejudice that would
present double jeopardy bar to vacating acceptance
of his pleas to misdemeanor charges and dismissing
them in favor of refiling of new felony charges,
where defendant was placed in essentially the same
position as he was prior to misplea; defendant did
not rely to his detriment on plea or confess to any
crimes or provide details which compromised his
ability to defend himself in subsequent action.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
*1146 Shelden R. Carter, Harris & Carter, Provo,
for Appellant.
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Joanne C.
Slotnik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and DAVIS and
THORNE, JJ.
OPINION

[9] Criminal Law €^274(3.1)
110k274(3.1) Most Cited Cases
Manifest necessity justified withdrawal of the
justice court's acceptance of defendant's pleas to
misdemeanor charges based on defendant's acts in
intentionally deceiving the court, by misleading
court into believing, when court could not find its
copy of misdemeanor traffic citation on day
defendant appeared, that charges on his copy of
citation were all of the charges pending from
incident, and by his later attempt to claim that court
system computer entry was final sentencing order,
even though was never signed by judge and never
intended to be actual signed court order. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
[10] Criminal Law €^274(3.1)
110k274(3.1) Most Cited Cases
In order to allow a misplea, it must be shown that
defendant will not suffer undue prejudice; misplea
is allowed unless defendant has taken some
affirmative action which would materially and
substantially affect the outcome of a subsequent
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
**1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to dismiss, arguing that the Double
Jeopardy Clause and the Single Criminal Episode
Act bar the State's reprosecution of charges against
him. Defendant claims the Payson Justice Court
previously received his pleas, sentenced him, and
issued a final order, barring any further State action
against him for charges arising out of the July 21,
1996 auto accident. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
**2 On July 21, 1996, defendant was involved in a
traffic accident in Utah County. At the time of the
accident, police issued a traffic citation for only the
misdemeanor offenses of no insurance, driving on a
suspended* 1147 license, and failure to yield.
Because the citation was for class B or C
misdemeanors, the local justice court had
jurisdiction to hear these charges. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-5-104(1) (Supp.2000). The citation
iim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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directed defendant to appear for court no earlier
than five days, but no later than fourteen days after
it was issued. Accordingly, defendant appeared at
the Pay son Justice Court on July 29, 1996—eight
days after receiving the citation.
**3 When defendant appeared in court, the court
clerk was unable to locate the court's copy of the
misdemeanor traffic citation.
In order to
accommodate defendant, the clerk made a copy of
the citation defendant brought with him and entered
it into the computer. A copy of the citation was
given to the judge who used it to conduct the
hearing. Defendant then pleaded no contest to the
driving on a suspended license charge and guilty to
the failure to yield and no insurance charges. After
defendant pleaded to the charges, the court orally
sentenced defendant with fines and jail time. The
court suspended part of the fine and all of the jail
time upon completion of court ordered probation.
**4 After the court accepted defendant's pleas and
orally imposed sentence, the court apparently
realized a mistake had been made when it found its
original copy of the misdemeanor citation. The
original citation had "voided" written on it and a
new citation was attached to it. As the clerk later
testified, none of the information about the plea and
sentence was entered into the court's computer
system and no final judgment was ever created or
signed.
**5 About a week after the July 29th hearing, the
Pay son City attorney moved the justice court to
dismiss the case without prejudice.
Despite
defendant's objection, the justice court granted the
motion to dismiss. Because defendant wished to
appeal the grant of the motion to dismiss, he asked
the justice court to produce a computer entry record
of the July 29th hearing. Defendant then appealed
the justice court's grant of the motion to dismiss to
the Fourth District Court.
**6 The district court held a de novo hearing
addressing defendant's claim. Judge John C.
Backlund issued his Findings of Fact and Order on
March 17, 1997, dismissing defendant's appeal.
Judge Backlund signed another order dismissing the

appeal on May 8, 1997. [FN1] Defendant appealed
Judge Backlund's orders to this court, and we
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
FN1. The State prepared the first order,
dated March 17, and defendant prepared
the second order dated May 8. There is no
indication in the record of a reason for
signing both orders.
**7 On January 23, 1997, the county attorney filed
an information charging defendant with six criminal
counts arising from the July 21, 1996 auto
accident. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that this action could not proceed because
the State was barred under both the Single Criminal
Episode Act and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
district court, Judge Anthony Schofield presiding,
held a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss.
During this hearing, the State produced as the sole
witness, Marley Lazenby, the Payson Justice Court
clerk. Ms. Lazenby testified about the events that
took place during the July 29th hearing and
subsequent computer document generated on
September 11th. The clerk testified that under
normal circumstances she would enter the
information from the hearing into the computer in
order to produce a final judgment. This final
judgment would reflect the charges, plea, and
sentence, and would subsequently be signed by the
judge
and
mailed
to the parties.
On
cross-examination, the clerk testified that the court
always prepares these final judgments and the judge
always signs them. After Ms. Lazenby's testimony,
defense counsel requested additional time to present
rebuttal evidence to show that the justice court
routinely fails to produce, sign, and mail final
judgments to the parties. The court allowed
defense counsel an additional ten days to submit
further evidence to the court.
The State
subsequently brought a motion to strike the
evidentiary hearing based partially on defendant's
failure to provide the court with any rebuttal
evidence. The district court granted the State's
motion, *1148 and noted that defendant had failed
to provide any further evidence.
**8

Judge

Schofield

later

issued

an

order
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concluding that the current proceeding did not
constitute double jeopardy. Specifically, Judge
Schofield determined that Judge Backlund had
already held that the justice court had not entered a
final judgment and therefore no jeopardy had
attached.
**9 Defendant then entered conditional guilty
pleas to use or possession of psilocybin and use or
possession of marijuana. Defendant now appeals
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] **10 Because we are limited to reviewing
Judge Schofield's order, we address only
defendant's claim that this action constitutes double
jeopardy. [FN2] Thus, the issue before us is
whether
double
jeopardy
precludes
the
reprosecution of defendant in this action. A trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss
presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App
060, t 6, 975 P.2d 505, cert, denied, 994 P.2d
1271 (Utah 1999).
FN2. Because we conclude that double
jeopardy does not bar the prosecution of
this case, we do not address defendant's
claim under the Single Criminal Episode
Act.
ANALYSIS
[2] **11 To the extent that defendant seeks to
reverse the justice court's dismissal of the
misdemeanor charges, we lack jurisdiction to
consider that argument. As we previously ruled
when defendant sought to appeal Judge Backlund's
decision, section 78-5-120 governs appeals from a
justice court, providing: "Any person not satisfied
with a judgment rendered in a justice court ... is
entitled to a trial de novo in the district court.... The
judgment after trial de novo may not be appealed
unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120
(Supp.2000). Defendant therefore exhausted his
right to appeal the justice court's dismissal of the
charges when he appealed to Judge Backlund. See
Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 050, 1| 9, 975 P.2d
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

946 (holding the right of appeal in criminal matters
is satisfied by right to de novo trial in district court);
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853,
854 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (per curiam) (holding
appeal of district court de novo review of justice
court judgment is not allowed unless it involves the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance), affd,
788 P.2d 513, 519 (Utah 1990).
**12 Although we do not address whether the
justice court erred in dismissing the charges, we can
examine Judge Schofield's ruling that this case does
not constitute double jeopardy because there was no
final order and therefore jeopardy did not attach to
the prior proceeding in the justice court. In his
order, Judge Schofield stated that Judge Backlund
"has previously addressed the issue of double
jeopardy," and "[t]he court declines to review Judge
Backlund's ruling on the issue of double
jeopardy." Our review of Judge Backlund's orders,
however, indicates that Judge Backlund never
addressed nor even mentioned the issue of whether
jeopardy had attached. Instead, Judge Backlund
merely found that the justice court had never
entered a final signed order, and thus the charges
could be dismissed. [FN3]
FN3. The first of Judge Backlund's orders
cited, without comment, State v. Wright,
904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah Ct.App.1995)
where we stated: "It is the law of this
state, as announced in State v. Curry, 814
P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (per
curiam), that a sentence is not entered until
it has been reduced to writing and signed
by the court."
[3] **13 Consequently, it is clear that Judge
Backlund never issued any ruling concerning
defendant's double jeopardy claim, and it is likely
that jeopardy was not even raised as an issue in the
appeal to Judge Backlund. Because Judge Schofield
relied on Judge Backlund's legal conclusion, both
district court orders focused on whether the justice
court issued a final signed order. Judge Schofield
was not required by the doctrine of res judicata or
other legal principles to rule in conformity with
Judge Backlund on the issue of when and if
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://print.westlawxom/delivery.html?format=HTMLE&dataid

6/9/2006

Page 6 of 9

Page 5

17 P.3d 1145
17 P.3d 1145, 412 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT App 4
(Cite as: 17 P.3d 1145, 2001 UT App 4)
jeopardy attached, since Judge Backlund did not
address *1149 the issue.
As a parallel
consequence, we are able to review Judge
Schofield's order, which held, for the first time, that
double jeopardy did not preclude the charges
against defendant in this case.
[4] **14 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
Const.amend. V. A double jeopardy claim presents
two questions. "The first is whether jeopardy in
fact 'attached' when the trial court accepted
[defendant's] first plea. The second is whether, if
jeopardy did attach, a reprosecution of the case is
permitted." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1024
(Utah Ct.App.1996). The Utah Supreme Court has
observed that it is well settled "that jeopardy
attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea and that
the entry of the plea, rather than the actual
imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment
for determining jeopardy." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d
1294, 1302 (Utah 1986) (internal citations omitted);
see also Moss, 921 P.2d at 1024. Thus, under the
facts of this case, the trial court's ruling is at odds
with the accepted rule that, notwithstanding whether
the justice court entered a final signed order,
jeopardy attached when the justice court accepted
defendant's guilty pleas. This case highlights what
appear to be seemingly conflicting rules in Utah's
appellate decisions.
**15 The First Circuit discussed the differing
approaches to this issue. See United States v. Cruz,
709 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir.1983). In Cruz, the
court noted that some courts have determined "that
jeopardy should attach to a guilty plea only upon
the
imposition
of
sentence
and
formal
pronouncement or entry of judgment. This would
give maximum flexibility to the court while still
fixing a clear point of finality and repose." Id.
(citing United States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295,
1298 (10th Cir.1980)); see also Curry, 814 P.2d at
1151 (court can impose higher sentence than it
originally orally imposed where court does not
reduce first oral sentence to final written and signed
order); State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102-03
(Utah Ct.App.1995) (oral sentence that is not

reduced to final written and signed order can be
modified by the court and does not violate double
jeopardy). In Cruz, however, the First Circuit
rejected the requirement that a final signed order is
necessary for jeopardy to attach and merely
required the acceptance of a guilty plea by the trial
court. See Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114. The Cruz court,
however, went on to craft a narrow exception
allowing a court to abrogate an accepted plea,
accompanied by detachment of jeopardy. The court
analogize[d] judicial abortion of a previously
accepted guilty plea and plea bargain to judicial
declaration of a mistrial after jeopardy has
attached—i.e., to hold that jeopardy attaches upon
acceptance of the guilty plea, but to allow the
district court to rescind acceptance at any time
before sentencing and judgment upon a showing
of 'manifest necessity,' the standard for declaring
a mistrial over the defendant's objection.
Id. (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)).
[5] **16 In Kay, the Utah Supreme Court adopted
the rule announced in Cruz, that jeopardy attaches
once a plea is accepted by the court, but the plea
can be set aside upon a showing of "manifest
necessity." See id., Ill P.2d at 1303; see also
Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025-26. By accepting the
approach adopted by the First Circuit, the supreme
court implicitly rejected the rule that a final signed
order is required before jeopardy attaches. See
Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114 (rejecting requirement of
"imposition of sentence and formal pronouncement
or entry of judgment").
**17 In Moss, the trial court accepted defendant's
plea in abeyance to attempted sexual abuse of a
child. See id., 921 P.2d at 1022. Later, the court
was informed that defendant's plea violated a
statutory prohibition against acceptance of a plea in
abeyance in cases involving victims under the age
of fourteen. See id. at 1023. Upon learning that
defendant's plea was illegal, the trial court set aside
defendant's plea and set the matter for a preliminary
hearing. See id. On appeal, defendant argued that
the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea was a
final adjudication which barred the subsequent
*1150 trial on the same charges. See id. at 1024.
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**18 Applying Kay, this court concluded that
jeopardy attached when the trial court accepted
defendant's plea in abeyance. See id. at 1024-25.
Specifically, this court declined to find Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable
because it only allows the denial of a plea prior to
its acceptance by the court. See id. at 1024.
Instead, this court determined that Kay controlled
the issue and that jeopardy attached when the trial
court accepted and approved defendant's plea. See
id. at 1024-25.
**19 In this case, however, the trial court relied on
Carry and Wright, holding that since the justice
court had not reduced the oral sentence to a final
written and signed order the case could be
dismissed and new charges could be filed without
offending double jeopardy. We believe, however,
that Curry and Wright do not resolve defendant's
claim that the justice court's acceptance of his guilty
plea and oral imposition of a sentence placed him in
jeopardy and that the newly filed charges
constituted double jeopardy.
**20 For example, in Curry, a short per curiam
opinion, the trial court accepted defendant's guilty
plea and orally sentenced defendant to concurrent
sentences. See id., 814 P.2d at 1150. Defendant
then moved the court to set aside the sentence and
order a ninety-day evaluation, which the court
granted. See id. In granting defendant's motion,
the court's minute entry stated that it was not
signing the sentence previously entered and that
sentencing was continued until after the ninety-day
evaluation. See id. After the ninety-day evaluation,
the court sentenced defendant to the same prison
term, but ordered them served consecutively. See
id. Upholding the trial court's order sentencing
defendant to consecutive prison terms, this court
held that "a judgment and sentence is not final and
appealable where the court orally finds defendant
guilty and sentences him but fails to enter written
findings of fact and a judgment." Id. at 1151.
Curry, however, did not address double jeopardy at
all, and thus it cannot stand for the proposition that
jeopardy attached only after the court entered a final
signed order. See id.

**21 Similarly, in Wright, defendant pleaded
guilty, and the court ordered a presentence report
from Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P) and set a
sentencing date. See id., 904 P.2d at 1102. The
court had not received the presentence report by the
date set for sentencing, and it reordered the report
and continued sentencing. See id. At the next
sentencing hearing, the court still had not received
the presentence report from AP & P. See id. At
defense counsel's request, the court orally sentenced
defendant, but suspended the prison term pending
defendant's successful completion of probation.
See id. The court, however, expressly declined to
sign the sentencing papers until it had a chance to
review the presentence report. See id.
After
reviewing the presentence report, the court
sentenced defendant to the same prison term, but
declined to suspend the term with probation. See id.
Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the
imposition of a more severe sentence constituted
double jeopardy. See id.
**22 Addressing defendant's claim, this court
extended the ruling in Curry to a double jeopardy
claim, and determined that defendant could not
legally have suffered double jeopardy until the court
entered a final signed order. See id. at 1102-03.
Specifically, this court stated that defendant
received only one sentence for his conviction, and
thus was not "placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense." Id. at 1103.
[6] **23 On the surface, the rule in Wright,
requiring a final signed order before jeopardy
attaches, appears to conflict with the rule in Kay,
Moss, and Cruz, requiring only acceptance of the
plea before jeopardy attaches. Neither Wright nor
Curry, however, discuss Kay as controlling law
because, unlike Kay, Moss, and Cruz, neither the
court nor the State in either case sought to set aside
defendant's plea. Rather, both decisions really
address the ability of the court to change sentencing
after orally announcing it, but prior to entering it in
a final signed sentencing order. In both Wright and
Curry, the court had issued statements expressly
declining to enter a final judgment until it *1151
had the opportunity to review a presentence report.
See Curry, 814 P.2d at 1150; Wright, 904 P.2d at
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1102. Thus, the rule adopted in Curry and Wright
is proper in cases where the court has expressly
declined to impose a final sentence until it has had
the opportunity to review sentencing information.
In that context, the requirement of a final signed
order signals that the court has issued its final
decision on sentencing and jeopardy attaches at that
point to preclude further modification of the
sentence.
**24 On the other hand, Kay, Moss, and Cruz are
cases where the court accepted defendant's guilty
plea and later attempted to set aside the plea in
order to allow the State to retry defendant on the
same charges. In these cases, jeopardy attached
once the court accepted defendants' pleas and orally
sentenced them. Thus, Kay, Moss, and Cruz are
distinguishable from and consistent with Wright and
Curry for two reasons: (1) Kay, Moss, and Cruz
address the situation where the court is asked to
declare a misplea in order to allow defendant to be
retried; and (2) those cases do not address a court's
power to modify an oral sentencing decision.
Furthermore, this court cannot disregard or overturn
decisions of the supreme court, and therefore Kay is
controlling precedent. [FN4]
FN4. We note, as did
see Moss, 921 P.2d at
continued viability of
Circuit is questionable.
v. Santiago Soto, 825
(1st Cir. 1987).

the Moss opinion,
1025 n. 8, that the
Cruz in the First
See United States
F.2d 616, 619- 20

[7] **25 The legal principles established by the
foregoing analysis are as follows: Jeopardy
attaches when a plea is accepted by a trial court. A
trial court, however, may (1) change an oral
sentencing decision when it has specifically
reserved that option pending receipt of further
information relevant to sentencing and the
sentencing decision is not binding on the court until
a final written order is entered; or (2) declare a
misplea in limited circumstances where there is
"manifest necessity" to do so and double jeopardy
will not then preclude reprosecution.
[8] **26 In applying these principles to this case,

we accept, as we must, the ruling of Judge Backlund
that a final order was not entered by the justice
court. Jeopardy, however, attached when the
justice court accepted defendant's pleas. By then
dismissing the case, the justice court essentially
declared a misplea. The State then refiled the same
charges and additional felony charges against
defendant in district court.
**27 "[Concluding jeopardy attaches, begins,
rather than ends our inquiry as to whether double
jeopardy bars defendant's retrial." Moss, 921 P.2d
at 1025. Under Kay and Moss, if manifest
necessity exists, a court may vacate an accepted
guilty plea without violating a defendant's right
against double jeopardy. See Kay, 111 P.2d at
1305; Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025. The justice court
could only rescind its acceptance of the guilty plea
and dismiss the misdemeanor charges "based on a
showing of 'manifest necessity' and 'no undue
prejudice to the defendant.' " Moss, 921 P.2d at
1025 (quoting Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305). Because
Judge Backlund and Judge Schofield did not reach
defendant's double jeopardy claim, neither judge's
order addresses whether there was manifest
necessity justifying withdrawal of the justice court's
acceptance of defendant's guilty plea. Whether
manifest necessity exists is a question of law. See
Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305; Moss, 921 P.2d at 1026.
**28 In Kay, the court addressed several
circumstances which would justify rescinding
acceptance of a plea. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305.
These include instances when accepting the plea is
the result of an "obvious reversible error," id., or
when the terms of the plea agreement are later
found to be illegal. Moss, 921 P.2d at 1024, 1028.
In
addition,
the
supreme
court
recognized: "Declaration of a misplea also seems
reasonable in situations where some fraud or
deception by one party leads to the acceptance of
the plea agreement by the other party or the court."
Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. Manifest necessity,
however, does not exist when a court "simply
change [s] its mind on the basis of information in
the presentence report, at least where that
information revealed less than fraud on the court."
Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114-15,
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*1152 [9] **29 When defendant appealed the
justice court's dismissal to the district court, Judge
Backlund issued two signed final orders. Both the
State and defendant prepared orders which the
judge ultimately signed. In the order prepared by
defense counsel, the following finding of fact was
made:
[T]he defendant came into the Payson City
Justice Court with the citation that contained the
Class B Misdemeanor of Driving on Suspension,
Failure to Yield and no insurance. The citation
for DUI was written on a separate citation and
other charges were sent to the County Attorney
for determination and review of the charges. The
court did not have the original citation, however,
the defendant gave the court a copy of his
misdemeanor citation.
Defendant misled the
court into thinking that those were all of the
charges. The court allowed him to make a plea
and issued an oral sentence.
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the justice court
clerk testified that she produced the computer entry
of the proceedings at defendant's request, sometime
in early September. Defendant attempted to claim
this entry, which was never signed by the judge and
never intended to be the actual final signed court
order, was the final court order. Based on Judge
Backlund's finding of fact and the clerk's testimony,
the evidence suggests that defendant consistently
engaged in tactics to mislead the court and avoid
punishment for the felony charges.
Thus,
defendant's acts of intentionally deceiving the court
fall into the circumstances contemplated by Kay as
sufficient to justify manifest necessity.
[10] **30 Finally, in order to allow a misplea, it
must be shown that defendant will not suffer undue
prejudice. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. In Kay,
defendant confessed to committing multiple
murders and gave specific details of the crime. See
id. at 1306. Defendant argued that allowing a
misplea would provide the State with a "road map"
in a subsequent trial. See id. Nevertheless, the
court held that since his confession would be
inadmissible in the subsequent trial defendant
would not suffer undue prejudice. See id. at 1307.

unless defendant "has taken some affirmative action
which would materially and substantially affect the
outcome of a subsequent retrial. Where the
defendant is simply placed in the same position as
he or she was prior to the guilty plea, there is no
undue prejudice to the defendant." Id., 921 P.2d at
1027.
[11] **32 Given the facts of this case, which are
much less egregious than in Kay, defendant suffered
no undue prejudice by allowing the dismissal of the
misdemeanor charges and the refiling of new
charges. Defendant has not shown that he relied to
his detriment on the plea entered in the justice
court. Nor did defendant confess to any crimes or
provide details which compromised his ability to
defend himself in the subsequent action. Rather,
defendant was placed in essentially the same
position as he was prior to misplea.
CONCLUSION
**33 We hold that jeopardy attached when the
justice court accepted defendant's guilty pleas. To
the extent that the district court determined that
double jeopardy would not be implicated by
dismissing these charges and allowing the State to
refile charges, it was in error. Nevertheless,
manifest necessity exists to allow a misplea in this
case.
Thus, defendant could properly be
reprosecuted on the original three misdemeanor
charges as well as the additional charges contained
in the subsequent information.
**34 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss.
**35 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge,
and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr., Judge.
17 P.3d 1145, 412 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT
App 4
END OF DOCUMENT

**31 In Moss, we stated that a misplea is allowed
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Appellant/Defendant I homas Max Jaramillo ("Jaramillo" or "'Appellant") appeals
from a final judgment of conviction for Burglary of a Vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in
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i utciii Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (2003) cvu- d b liie

Honorable Robin W. Reese, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. 1 his Court has
jwii.Ai.jjon over criminal convictions ou^i ,.M;. nrst ucgax ;donies. I Itah Code .Ann.
§ 78-2a~ :- / '

iiH

v-f. " -'*fthe judgment is in Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue. AVneinc; .;.w

.

.

.,

. ^ consecutive jail terms whcic nil lid

not designate the terms as consecutive in the written order of judgment entered into the
record at the original sentencing?
Standard of Review: I he stai idai d c i i e\ iew on sentencing issues is an abuse of
disc-- r

See State v. Perez, 2002 U 1 App AH,

1

n

•

I

Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 77:5-6.
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statute and constitutional provisions are in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003);
U.S. Const, amend. V;
Utah Const, art. I, §12.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 20, 2002, Mr. Jaramillo was charged with two counts of burglary of
a vehicle, class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204, two counts
of criminal mischief, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6106(l)(c), two counts of theft, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (2003), and public intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt
Lake City Ordinance § 11.12.060. R. 1-2. On February 26, 2003, Mr. Jaramillo pled
guilty to one count of burglary of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor; criminal mischief, a
class B misdemeanor; and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor. R. 19-20.
On September 12, 2003, Judge Robin Reese signed a final written order of
judgment sentencing Mr. Jaramillo to 365 days in jail for the burglary conviction and 180
days in jail for the criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. Judge
Reese suspended 315 days of the burglary sentence and all of the 180 days for the
criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; Addendum C. Mr. Jaramillo was placed on
probation for 2 years, ordered to pay $1200 in restitution, and perform 50 hours of
community service. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C.

2

On February 9, 2004, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held where Mr
Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation I

.-o_ -.... *,.- 4. iu; w H.U louiu; Tr

trial court imposed the 315 cays in jail for the burglary conviction, suspending all ex,
60 days. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial court ordered credit for the 60 days

w aramiho

w

• 1 Mr.

Jaramillo on probation for 3 years for the binglary conviction. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial
court re-imposed the 180 day sentence for the criminal mischief conviction, suspending
iII

Ill mi il

II

1

i I ''mi

1 Hi

m i I pi! in M I I1 I mi I in I ni ni ni mi I I

in I ni mi b i l l i o n I nine win loi I In

criminal mischief conviction, to run concurrently with the first term of probation. R.
76:7.
Oi I Decen lbei 13 200 Il , ai i Order to Show Cai lse heat ing v\ as 1 le Id w here Mr.
Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation. R. 77:2-3 The trial court found Mr.
Jaramillo in violation of his probation and revoked it,

^ 6 : Addendum A, The trial

giving credit for the time most recently served. R. 61; 77:6; Addendum A. The trial
court also revoked Mr. Jaramillo's probation on the criminal ....-di^ f conviction and reini|i )'M ill llit
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i riii it ordered the

sentences to be served consecutively.'' R. 61; 77:6. Mr. Jaramillo timely appealed. R.
62-69.

1

However, on the signed minme oiuei u\ Sentence, Judgment, Commitment the trial
court did not note that the ^ mmrr^ w crc to run consecutively. See Addendum A.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Jaramillo pled guilty to one count of burglary of a vehicle, a class A
misdemeanor; criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor; and intoxication, a class C
misdemeanor. R. 19. The trial court sentenced Mr. Jaramillo to 365 days in jail for the
burglary conviction and 180 days in jail for the criminal mischief conviction. R. 28;
94:3-4; Addendum C. The trial court suspended 315 days of the burglary sentence and
all of the 180 days for the criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C.
The trial court placed Mr. Jaramillo on probation for 2 years, ordered to pay $1200 in
restitution, and perform 50 hours of community service. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. A
final order of sentence, judgment and commitment was signed and entered into the record
on September 12, 2003. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C.
On February 9, 2004, the trial court held an Order to Show Cause hearing where
Mr. Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation. R. 76:2-3. The trial court found Mr.
Jaramillo in violation of his probation and imposed the 315 days in jail for the burglary
conviction but suspended all except 60 days of it. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial court also
ordered credit for the 60 days Mr. Jaramillo would serve on his burglary conviction. R.
52-54; 76:6-7. Mr. Jaramillo probation was modified and he was placed on probation for
3 years for the burglary conviction. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial court re-imposed the 180
day sentence for the criminal mischief conviction but suspended all of it. R. 52-54; 76:7.
Mr. Jaramillo was placed on probation for one year for the criminal mischief conviction,
to run concurrently with the first term of probation. R. 52-54; 76:7.
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On December 13, 2004, another Order to Show Cause hearing was held where Mr.
Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation R. 3 i; ::2 3 1 1 i " tr ial court, informed Mr.

and he would serve "about 435 days jail." R 77:3. Defense counsel argued that the
docket indicated that absent a notation that the sentences were originally ordered to run

requested that if Mr. Jaramillo's probation is revoked then his sentence should be that he
receive 255 days for the burglary of the vehicle conviction with the
ci ii i lii ial i i lischief coi I s i ::ti : it I il: ;: i: i n I z :: i l z\ in: i: si ltb

aays for the

R ) J :6

The trial court revoked Mr. Jaramillo's probation R 77:6; Addendum \
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L>'\ ini: i r e '

-.*< m t l *

. *\

int

also revoked Mr. Jaramillo"^ probation on the criminal mischief conviction am: it
imposed the 180 days suspended .
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running the sentences consecutively, the trial judge stated, "[M]y understanding is that I
don't have to make that election until I impose the sentence and I'll make that election

paid in full. R. 77:6-7. This appeal follows.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Once a trial court signs and enters a final order of judgment into the record and
acts upon it, the sentence becomes final. After the order in this case became final, the
trial court's authority and jurisdiction continued only over the defendant's probation
terms. The trial court did not retain jurisdiction or authority over the case to increase the
sentence originally imposed. The only jurisdiction and authority a trial court has at an
order to show cause hearing is to revoke, modify, continue, or order the entire probation
term to start over. In this case, the trial court entered a final order of judgment without
ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Absent such an order by the court the
sentences are presumed to run concurrently. The trial court erred in amending Mr.
Jaramillo's original sentence and ordering it to be served consecutively after he violated
his probation. The trial court's error violated Mr. Jaramillo's constitutional and statutory
rights against double jeopardy.
ARGUMENT
POINT. WHERE A TRIAL COURT HAS SIGNED A FINAL ORDER OF
JUDGMENT AND ENTERED IT INTO THE RECORD, THE COURT UPON
REVOKING PROBATION CANNOT INCREASE THE SENTENCE
ORIGINALLY IMPOSED.
While a trial court has "continuing jurisdiction over all probationers," until the
probation term is completed, it is without jurisdiction or authority once it acts on an order
of judgment and sentence from amending the original sentence imposed upon revocation
of probation. See Utah Code Ann. 77-18-1 (2)(b)(iii) (2003). In this case, the trial court
erred after it revoked Mr. Jaramillo's probation and ordered the original sentence

6

imposed to be served consecutively rather than concurrently

'

: :.u court's error

violated Mr. Jaramillos constitutional and statutory rights against double jeopardy.
"Ii 1 a I Jtal i ci iit i: lii lal :as = , a final ji ldgn lent occi irs when the trial court enters the
written judgment of conviction, including the sentence, into the record." State v. Todd,
2004
c

vpp _i„

' - •»*! •

, ..d 46, cert, granted, 109 I ' 3d 804, Ii ais case, tl le ti lal
;

;

- • ndgment on September 13 21)03 R 28;

Addendum C. I he judgment imposed did not require that the sentences be served
consecutively. Utah case law is clear that once a trial court signs and enters a final
ji doni.

.

' ^ sr-nien.' • !

loses jurisdiction to amend the sentence. See Stat z
Ct. Arr 1^*
j1

r

*--;ii ;nd the trial court

I" lontoya, 825 P.2d 6765 679 (Utah

* )nce a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter
:ase ' " ).

2

This issue is preserved. An issue is properly preserved if'""the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on (he issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125,
129 (Utah Ct. App. ! tJI>7) (citations omitted). Even though defense counsel did not
specifically argue that ordering the sentences to be served consecutively would violate
double jeopardy, she did argue that because the original judgment lacked a notation that
the sentences were to run consecutively, the law presumes that they are to run
concurrently. R. 77:5-6. The trial judge considered defense counsel's argument but
rejected it on his belief that he does not "have to make that election until [he] impose[s]
the sentence." R. 77:6. But even if the issue was not preserved, this Court should reverse
because the trial court's error was plain. Error is plain if it "should have been obvious to
the trial court" and was prejudicial. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^|13, 10 P.3d 346
(citation omitted). In this case, the trial court's error was obvious because case law is
clear that once an order of judgment/sentence is signed and entered inti the recon it
becomes final and the trial court loses authority and jurisdiction to amend i
Appellant's Brief 6-12 It was also prejudicial because the trial court, by ordei ;•:<. ] ie
sentences to run consecutively, thereby increasing Mr. Jaramillo5s original sentem i\
punished Mr. Jaramillo twice for the same offense ^ee Arm'-ii-mtV n , ' ; p f A - p
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While a final order does not exist when the trial court orally pronounces sentence
but does not sign the judgment and the defendant does not commence serving it, once a
final order of judgment has been signed and entered into the record, the trial court loses
the authority and jurisdiction to amend the sentence. See State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Wright 904 P.2d 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In Curry, the defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony and a third degree
felony with the state recommendation that the sentences be served concurrently. 814
P.2d at 1150. On May 18, 1990, the trial court ordered sentences of one to fifteen years
for the second degree felony and zero to five on the third degree felony to be served
concurrently with one another. Id The defendant then sought to include additional
information for the court's consideration in sentencing and "moved the court to set-aside
the sentence and order a ninety-day evaluation." Id. The court held a hearing on May 23,
1990, on the defendant's motion and filed a minute entry which stated '"I. THE COURT
WILL NOT SIGN THE JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT) THAT WAS
ORDERED ON MAY 18, 1990. 2. THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO COMPLETE
A 90 DAY EVALUATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. THE SENTENCE IS
CONTINUED TO AUGUST 31, 1990 at 10:30 AM.'" Id (emphasis in original). On
September 7, 1990, after the court had received the evaluation ordered, it "sentenced
defendant to the same prison terms but ordered that they be served consecutively." Id,
This Court held that the trial court's subsequent imposition of a consecutive sentence did
not violate Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (1990) because the trial court's "oral statement. . .
regarding defendant's sentence was not reduced to writing" until September 7 ,
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therefore, the sentence was not "'set aside 5 " within the meaning of that statute. Id. at
1151.
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incendiary device and the tr::il court ordered a presentence report, setting sentencing for
June 20 904 P.2d at i *
ft;]-
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sentencing was continued until.
•• »'«•

.
"*<^

4. when/\.\v:; 3
* ••'• sentence

report was still not complete but "defense counsel urged the court, to proceed with
sentencing." IdL
The trial court annoui iced from the bench that is wouiu seniemv Wright to
zero to five years in state prison, but that it would suspend HK pi ison term
pending Wright's successful completion of a thirty-six month probation ».* ;
period. [However, a]t a hearing held one week later, July 18, 1994, the trial
court announced that it would not sign the proposed commitment order
•~'H it had a chance to review the presentence report from AP&P. The trial
1 stated, "There is no judgment, there is no sentence until I si**n those
v,l"&.

Id. (emphasis add

the trial court to consider in sentencing Wright.*' IcL At the August 29 hearing, after
reviewing the presentence report, the trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years

grant the defendant probation. IdL This Court determined that this defendant, like the one
in Curry, "sought to include in the presentence report additional information for the trial
cniiil

irorisiclcralKiii .illei lln oral |iniiiiniiii rinenf til "n mil in r lllinil ill1

.ttlirt tine (m.ii

court had indicated its intent to modify the originally announced sentence.' IcL In
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affirming the trial court, this Court held that since the trial court's oral statement of
sentencing had not been reduced to writing, the sentence was not entered until the time it
was "reduced to writing and signed." Id.
Unlike the trial court in Curry and Wright, the trial court in this case did reduce
Mr. Jaramillo's sentence to writing and entered it into the record. R. 28; Addendum C.
In addition, unlike the trial courts in those cases, the trial court in this case did not state
on the record that it was refusing to sign the order pending the receipt of further evidence.
Id. Nor did it indicate any intention of modifying the sentence in the future. Id Finally,
unlike Curry and Wright, Mr. Jaramillo's sentence commenced on the date it was
announced and Mr. Jaramillo began serving the sentence on that date. Once a trial court
enters a final signed order of judgment into the record and a defendant begins serving a
sentence, that sentence becomes final. See Todd, 2004 UT App 266 at ^|10 n.l; Curry,
814 P.2d at 1151; Wright, 904 P.2d at 1102. This insures that such clerical omissions do
not affect the substantial rights of a defendant or undermine the justice system. See Utah
R. Crim. P. 30. Therefore, once the trial court entered a written order of judgment into
the record, and acted on it, the order was final and the trial court lost the authority to do
anything other than to impose the original sentence entered upon revocation of Mr.
Jaramillo's probation. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Utah Code
Ann. §77-18-1 (12)(e)(iii).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 grants trial courts the authority after an order to show
cause hearing to order "probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire
probation term commence anew." Id. at § 77-18-1 (12)(e)(ii). If the trial court
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determines that probation should be revoked then the statute only allows the trial court
the authority to either sentence the defendant if he has not previously been sentenced or

defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.";

:

this case, the trial court had entered a audi order o. judgment against Mr. Jaramillo on

Therefore, the trial court was left only with the authorih *

:ute the sentence

previously imposed as it was entered into the record, luster

...v. ;nu! court at the

ordered the terms to run consecutively with each oilier in w

s; urn of the statute. R 61;

77:6; Addendum A.
In additi in llm ilim ill
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exceeds statutory authority and constitutes a more severe pium

n'vnl i i nscnilivrh
. originally

ordered and violates Mi. J<t ..nilk/s constitutional and statutory protections against
d : "i lble jeo]
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§ 77-1-6 (2)(a) (2003). The filth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy,
^Hivuiiic u> t.„ states thro 1 !.^ u^ , ^urteenth. Amendment, protects individuals from..
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. amend. V (' tic-sh:il!-::*•. ^erson

be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardv o: life or limb/'); Utah Cart. I, >

>o\ b'uL\ii ,iiiy person be twice put in jeopard} .. . the same OIICHSL, J, Utah

Code Ann M """T I i i ""l(;i| i I" In person shall hv put twice in icoparcb Inrthe same
offense."). "If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is
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that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence. And .. . there has
never been any doubt of [this rule's] entire and complete protection of the party when a
second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same
statutory offence." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969) (quoting Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)).
The United States Supreme Court determined long ago that double jeopardy is
violated when a trial court increases a sentence after a defendant has commenced to serve
it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 176. "The Constitution was designed as much to prevent
the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for
it." Id. at 173. Therefore, the trial court violated double jeopardy in this case where it
entered a final order of judgment and then later increased Mr. Jaramillo's sentence at the
order to show cause hearing after he had already commenced serving it. The trial court
was without jurisdiction or authority under either the constitution or statute to run Mr.
Jaramillo's original sentence consecutively.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court exceeded its authority and jurisdiction by imposing Mr.
Jaramillo's jail terms consecutively at the order to show cause hearing, Mr. Jaramillo,
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court error.
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ADDENDUM A
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE c d a f e j ? ^ ^ .-c
• cSALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH >^C&-ig#v*^**
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs,
Case No: 021912690 MO
THOMAS MAX

JARAMILLO,

Judge:
Date:

Defendant.

ROBIN W. REESE
December 13, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHNSON, HEATHER
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 10, 1981
Video
Tape Number:

TAPE

**

Tape Count; 10:37

CHARGES
1. BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea; Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty
7. INTOXICATION - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Oisposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty
HEARING
DEFT ADMITTS ALLEGATIONS 1-4-5-6-7-8
DENIES ALLEGATIONS 2-3 C/O STRICKEN ON STATE MOTION
C/O PROBATION REVOKED
-DEFT TO SERVE JAIL TERM
-C/O DEFT TO PAY FULL RESTITUTION - TO BE ENTERED AS A CIVIL
JUDGMENT

Page l

T

FAX NO. 80^87564

P. 06

DEC-16-2004THU 08:52 Atl CP MNALDEPT

Case No: 021912690
Date:
Dec 13, 2004
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE a
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 255
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is.
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(a)
The total time suspended for this charge is.

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
C/0 CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED
Dated this

f 2? day of

Page 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) l b the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings —
Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The
court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.

(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to

sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:

(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at anytime at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the
payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the
account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt
of court,
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.

(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;

(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

ADDENDUM C

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021912690 MO

THOMAS MAX JARAMILLO,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

ROBIN W. REESE
September 12, 2003

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Prosecutor: CHIN, AUGUSTUS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LILLY, CATHERINE L.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 10, 1981
Video
Tape Number:
TAPE
Tape Count: 10:33
CHARGES
1. BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty
7. INTOXICATION - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE a
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 315 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
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Date:
Sep 12, 2003
COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete 50 hour(s) of community service.
Community service to be completed through Adult Probation & Parole.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $1200.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: UNKNOWN
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 50 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
PAY $1,200.00 RESTITUTION
SERVE 50 DAYS JAIL, CTS
WORK 50 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE
MAINTAIN STABLE RESIDENCE
COMPLETE SUBSTANCE ABUSE EVALUATION AND COUNSELING
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Date:
Sep 12, 2003
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS
Dated this

JQ^ day of
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